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RULES  AND DISCRETION IN TRADE POLICY 
ABSTRACT 
We argue in this paper that the  second—best  nature of trade-policy 
intervention makes it likely that the  issue  of time consistency  viii be 
an important consideration in determining  both the extent and  the 
efficacy of such intervention in most environments.  The point is seen 
most directly by noting that a tariff is both a tax on consumers and a 
subsidy to producers of the import—competing  good.  Since first—best 
intervention typically calls for targeting each distortion with a 
separate tax/subsidy, the tariff will be a more effective policy tool if 
its consumption tax aspect can be separated from its production subsidy 
dimension.  Consequently, if production  decisions are made prior to 
consumption decisions,  a government with sufficient policy flexibility 
will be tempted to surprise producers with policies other than those 
announced in an effort to make this separation.  This leads optimal 
trade policy intervention to be time—inconsistent in a wide range of 
environments.  We explore this idea in general terms and  illustrate  the 
results with specific examples. 
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Stanford, CA  94305  Los Angeles, CA  90024 1.  Introduction 
Since the publication of  the seminal paper of  Kydland and Prescott (977) on 
the time inconsistency of  optimal policy, the debate over rules versus discretion 
has had a major  influence on  the evolution of  ideas  concerning macroeconomic 
policy.  In contrast, this debate has had comparatively little effect on the 
international trade literature, where discussion concerning the efficacy of 
activist trade policy in general and the relative merits of  alternative trade 
policies in particular has proceeded largely under the (implicit) assumption that 
governments can precommit to the optimal polloy. 
Yet the question of the costs of discretion in trade policy deserves serious 
attention, especially  in light of  the recent literature on trade in the presence 
of imperfect markets.  While much of this literature is concerned with various 
conditions under which activist trade policies are warranted, taken together the 
results of the literature suggest a second, more subtle, implication:  the new 
activist trade policy, if It  is to be pursued at all,  must be pursued with 
discretion and flexibility, judging each situation on a case by case basis.-!!'  As 
such, the current debate over the appropriate degree of activism in trade policy 
is unavoidably a debate over the appropriate degree of  policy discretion as well. 
The relevance for trade policy of the debate on rules versus discretion  is 
also suggested by  the following consideration:  a necessary condition for any 
economic policy to be time inconsistent is that the government implementing that 
policy find itself in a second best (or worse) situation.  This condition is 
virtually always satisfied in the case of trade policy:  if the government is 
forced to rely  on tariffs to achieve its objectives, it  is because it lacks —2— 
other, less distortionary,  instruments2'  In this envircnment, unexpected policy 
sotions can enlarge the set of instruments available to the government.  Hence, 
if a government using trsde policy hed the option of  surprising the privste 
sector with unexpeoted potioies, it would choose to do so since s policy surprise 
could move the economy towards the first best.  In other words, with e sufficient 
degree of discrsticn snd flexibility, the cptimsl trsde policy is bound to be 
time inconsistent. 
The centrsl results of  this psper srs bssed on the ides that governments 
often enjoy sufficient discretion to generste trade policy surprises with respect 
to production decisions, but not with respect to consumption decisions.  While 
decisions concerning the allocation of  consumption across different commodities 
are generally fairly flexible, decisions concerning investment or resource 
allocation are often much less so.  Hence, in the presence of sufficient 
government flexibility, the latter decisions might have to  be made before 
observing trade policy actions.  When this is the case, production decisions must 
be based on  the expectations of forthcoming trade policies, and the government 
has the option of generating policy surpriaea.  Cf  course, in equilibrium policy 
surprises are ruled out by an  incentive compatibility condition.  This condition 
implies that the government loses control of producers' expectations.  Thus, in 
an equilibrium with discretion, the government is prevented from taking into 
account the production distortions induced by  the expectation of future trade 
policy. 
The next section develops the normative end positive implications of this 
idea.  Sections III  and IV illustrate these general results with specific —3-. 
examples.  Possible extensions and generalizations are discussed In Section V. 
Finally, Section VI conoludes the paper. 
II  Time inconsistency  and Trade Policy 
Consider the basic trade model of  a static economy in which all goods are 
traded and individuals act as producers and/or consumers.  The arguments of  this 
and of the next two sections hinge on  the following crucial timing assumption: 
First, producers select the allocation of productive resources, I.e.  they select 
a point on  the (possibly distorted) production possibility frontier.-/ Next (or 
simultaneously with the producers), the government chooses its  tariff policy. 
Finally, consumers make their consumption decisions.  This is equivalent to 
assuming that the government has at least as much flexibility in choosing the 
level of its tariff as does the private sector in choosing the sectoral 
allocation of resources, but  that consumer decisions are the most flexible of 
all.  Clearly this is not always the case in practice; but the assumption seems 
to capture the relative timing of moves for the three kinds of agents in a broad 
class of environments, provided that the government is endowed with sufficiently 
flexible trade policy instruments.  For instance, such flexibility might 
characterize escape clause actions under section 201  of  the Trade Act of 1974. 
The implications of relaxing this timing assumption are discussed in Section V 
below. 
The Importance of the timing assumption Is immediate once it is recalled 
that a tariff can always be decomposed Into a domestic production subsidy and a 
domestic consumption tax on  the domestic import good.  The timing assumption 
implies that, in equilibrium, the government is forced to  take producers' decisions as bygones when choosing its  trade policy.  Hence, the government 
ignores any production distortions introduced by theprcduction  tax/subsidy 
aspect of its tariff policy:  the tariff is set as if the distortions it brcught 
about were only those associated with the ccnsumpticn tax/subsidy dimension.  But 
of  course, the expectaticn of  the forthcoming tariff policy exerts an influence 
on  the producticn aide of the economy, even if in equilibrium the government is 
prevented from taking this into account. 
We now explore this idea in general terms, turning to specific illustrative 
examples in the following aecticna.  To  begin we consider an  environment in which 
lump sum instruments are available to redistribute inccme, so that the domestic 
government is concerned only with the  conditions of  Paretc efficiency.  We 
explore the time—inconsistency issues that arise when the government attempts to 
use trade policy  (a tariff) to offset existing distcrtions.F' 
(i)  Consider first the existence of  a domestic production distorticn.  A 
production tax/subsidy can move the economy toward (possibly to) the Pareto 
frontier, but a consumption tax/subsidy  will only move it further swey.  Thus, 
regardless of the (ex—ente) tariff policy announced to producers, once production 
decisions sre made, the government faces a new (ax—post) optimization problem: 
set the tariff level so that the consumption tax implicit in it maximizes welfare 
(achieves Pareto efficiency)  in s smell exchange economy with  no distortions. 
The resulting equilibrium policy  is clearly free trade, even though the (second— 
best or worse) optimal tariff policy is typically not free trade."  Hence,  in the 
presence of  policy discretion, trade policy will be under utilized as 5 (second— 
best or worse) tool to  sddress production distortions:  tn such an environment, 
the unique time—consistent equilibrium is one of free trade.  Section  III  below —5— 
provides an  Illustration of  this case. 
(ii)  Consider next the existence of a domestic consumption distortion. 
Here a consumption tax/subsidy can move the country to the Pareto frontier, but 5 
production tax/subsidy must move it further away.  Again, independent of  the (ex— 
ante) tariff policy announced to producers, once production decisions are nade, 
the government faces a new (ex—post) optimization problem:  set  the tariff level 
so that the consumption tax implied therein maximizes welfare (achieves Pareto 
efficiency)  in a small exchange economy with a domestic consumption distortion. 
Here the time—consistent policy is clearly to set the tariff at a level which 
exactly offsets the domestic consumption distortion, even though the (second— 
best) optimal tariff will stop short of  this because of the production 
distortions introduced by  the tarlff..Y  Thus, the use of  trade policy as  a 
(second—best) tool to address domestic consumption distortions when the 
government has policy discretion will be excessive. 
(iii)  Finally, consider the existence of a trade distortion.  The relevant 
point here is that a tariff now also affects foreign production and oonsumption 
decisions.  In choosing a tariff, the domestic government must weigh the benefits 
of tariff revenue against the costs of the distorted producer and consumer 
decisions in the domestic economy.  At the (ex—ante) optimum tariff, a smell 
increase in the tariff would lead to  an increase In tariff revenue whose benefits 
are just offset by  the costs of Increasing distortions at home.  However, once 
domestic and foreign production decisions are made, domestic and foreign 
production responses to further tariff changes disappear, and a small increase in 
the tariff starting from the (ex-ante) optimum will Increase tariff revenue by 
more than the cost of  the increased distortion at home.  Hence, the time— —6— 
consistent  tariff  in this case involves excessive protecion.  This point has 
been made by Lapan  (forthcoming).L" 
(iv)  Thus far we have maintained the assumption that lump sum 
redistributive instruments are available and have explored the nature of time— 
consistent trade policy when one of  the conditions for Pareto efficiency  is 
violated.  Consider now the case in which all the conditions for Pareto 
efficiency hold but the government wishes to redistribute income and does not 
have access to lump sum tax instruments.  In this case the government would like 
to leave all economic decisions undistorted but at the same time desires to alter 
the distribution of income.  The (ex—ante)  optimal use of  a tariff  would at the 
margin weigh the redistributive benefits against the costs of  domestic producer 
and consumer distortions.  However, once producer decisions are made, the (ex- 
post) redistributive effects of an additional increase in the tariff will in 
general differ from the effects ax—ante, and the associated benefits may rise or 
fall.  Moreover, these benefits will be weighed only  against the additional 
consumer distortions  induced.  Hence, when the government has policy discretion. 
trade policy may be over— or under—utilized as a redistributive tool.  Section 
III below  illustrates  a case in which policy  is over—utilized with an example 
taken from Staiger—Tabellini (1987). 
We  summarize these results in the following: 
Proposition:  When the degree of flexibility  in government trade policy 
decision making  is greater (less)  than it is  In the resource allocation 
(consumption) decisions of the private sector, tariffs will be under 
utilized relative to  their optimal use In the presence of domestic 
production distortions, over utilized relative to  their optimal use in the 
presence of  domestic consumption distortions and trade distortions, and 
either under— or over—utilized relative to their optimal use as 
redistributive tools. —7— 
Three implications emerge from this general analysis.  First, because trade 
policy distorts the decisions of both producers and consumers and because the 
decisions of the former typically preceed those of the latter, sufficient 
government flexibility is likely to undermine the optimal use of  trade policy 55 
a  remedy  for  the existence of  distortions.  That is,  optimal trade policy in this 
broad class of problems will in general be time—inconsistent.  Whenever this is 
the case, rules may be better than discretion in the conduct of trade policy. 
Second, given that optimal trade policy is generally time—inconsistent in this 
environment, policy rankings that acknowledge this time—inconsistency will 
generally differ from the analogous rankings based on  the optimal (time- 
inconsistent) tariff.  Finally, with the existence of  domestic consumption 
distortions considered to be empirically unimportant as a trade policy rationale 
(see Bhagwati, 968), our results suggest that a government with policy 
discretion will use tariffs primarily in two oases:  either as redistributive 
tools, or where it has world market power.  In the next two sections we 
illustrate the general conclusions drawn here with specific examples. 
III.  Over—Active Policies 
We consider first a two-sector model in which tariffs are used by the 
government to redistribute income from individuals with a low marginal utility of 
income to those with a high marginal utility of income, subsequent to the 
realization of an  adverse terms of trade shock.  In order to focus on the issue 
of precommitment, we  suppose that the government is benevolent and maximizes a 
social welfare function defined over the utility of the workers in both 
sectors.  In the absence of complete insurance markets, the government may wish —8— 
to use trade polioy to reduoe  interseotoral wage differentials that arise as a 
result of the shook 
In partioular, we start with a small open eoonomy produoing two traded 
goods,  x  and  y,  using one input, labor.  Suppose that labor oan move aoross 
seotors, but only at a oost.  Speoifioally, assume that whenever a worker onanges 
seotors, its marginal produot fells by the fraotion  1  — A, 1  >  A  >  C.  Consider 
now what happens if the world prioe of the imported good,  say  y,  drops 
unexpeotedly.  If it drops by sore than  (1  — A),  some fraotion  (1  — i)  >  0  of 
seotor  ys  work foroe will find it worthwhile to relooate aoross seotors.  The 
post—shook equilibrium allooation of labor  is illustrated by the interseotion of 
the solid lines in figure 1,  under the assumptions that the produotion funotion 
is oonoave and that the government does not (and is not expeoted to)  intervene 
with trade proteotion.  The horizontal axis measures  1,  the  fraotion of 
aeotor  y's  pre-shook labor foroe that  remains in the injured seotor.  The 
vertioal axis measures the wage in seotor  y  and  A  times the wage rate in 
seotor  x.  te  denotes the expeoted degree of  tariff proteotion.  Given the 




in the fraotion of workers who remain in that seotor  ('1)  and is represented by 
a downward sloping aohedule in  Figure  1.  Conversely,  wx  is Inoreasing with 
1,  and  AWx 
is given by the upward sloping aohedule in FIgure 
1  .  The 
equilibrium allooation of  labor when proteotion is neither expeoted nor 
forthooming  is  1(1e  G),  and oorresponds to the point where the wage 




Now  consider  the  actions  of  the government.  As noted at the outset, the 
government may wish to use trade policy to reduce the wage differential between 
the two sectors.  However, the actual redistribution associated with any given 
tariff depends on  the fraction of workers remaining In the injured sector  (i), 
which depends Ln turn on  the expected tariff.  As such, unexpected protection can 
have effects quite apart f'om protection that is fully anticipated by  the work 
force.  This is why the issue of time inconsistency arises:  the government may 
have an  incentive to surprise the private sector by providing more protection 
than expected. 
In order to see that this is the case, consider what happens to the diagram 
of Figure 1  if workers anticipate the protective policy.  An increase in the 
degree of protection forthcoming would shift the  w 
curve to the right—-say,  to 
the dolted line of Figure  1,  where  t — t  >  0.  With the tariff fully 
anticipated  ie = t),  the fraction of  labor staying in the  y  sector in 
equilibrium  is now  .re*(te  t) > IC(e  0),  and the equilibrium wage 
w' 
differential remains  —  —  A.  Intuitively,  if  workers  realize  that  the 
x  w 
protective  policy  is  forthcoming,  they  will  reduce  their  reallocation  away  from 
the  injured  sector.  Under  our  hypothesis,  a  perfectly  anticipated  protective 
policy  would  have  no  impact  on  the wage differential, but would Simply bring 
about an  inefficient allocation of labor.  If however, the protective policy were 
unexpected, then it would take the economy to point A in Figure 1:  the labor 
allocation would remain unaffected, and all the impact of  the policy would be on 
the wage differential.  Hence the government's incentive to  surprise.  Since the 
government is not able systematically to deceive the private sector, the (time 
consistent) equilibrium  is found where the government's Incentive to surprise is —  10  — 
just equal to the marginal ooat of the oonsumption distortions associated with a 
higher  tariff. 
In  Staiger and Tabellini  (1987), we  show that in such  an  equilibrium the 
tariff is always positive, even though the optimal trade oolioy may be one of 
free trade.  Hence, the requirement of  time consistenoy implies in this osse that 
governments with some degree of  disoretion in trade polioy may be forced to 
choose inferior over—protective policies.  This comes about not as a result of 
lobbying pressures or other political concerns.  Rather, it is a consequence of 
the government's inability to preccmmit to trade policies which it would not, 
once the labor force has reallocated, care to pursue.  Moreover, the requirement 
of time consistency can lead to  a reversal of  the traditional normative orderings 
of tariffs and subsidies as  instruments of  trade policy.  Since a production 
subsidy  is not assocIated with any consumption distortions, there is a greater 
incentive to utilize it as a surprise policy tool.  Consequently, its  time 
consistent level would always be higher than that of  a time consistent tariff. 
As a result, in a time consistent equilibrium a policy of  production subsidies 
may be welfare—dominated by  a tariff. 
IV,  Pareto Inferior Trade 
In this section, we  explore the use of  trade policy to address a distortion 
that arises in the allocation of productive resources between a safe and a risky 
sector.  Specifically, consider a two—country two—sector model with one safe and 
one risky sector.  In  the presence of production risk that is not perfectly 
positively correlated across countries, trade policy decisions will affect the 
extent to which prices adjust in response to variations in output.  As  such, trade policy will  affect the degree of risk borne by producers, and the 
allocation of productive resources between risky and non—risky sectors. 
Consumers will be affected by trade policy in two ways:  direotly via the effect 
of policy on  the risk (price variability) they face, and Indirectly via the 
sectoral relocation of productive resources. 
Newbery and StIglltz  (98U  explore these issues with a simple model in 
which the opportunity to  trade goods internationally completely stabilizes goods 
prices.  In  their model, trade leaves producers earning the same expected return 
but facing greater risk than in autarky. while consumers enjoy reduced risk but 
suffer a divergenc, of  the resource allocation away from their preferred 
pattern.  Risk averse producers are unambiguously worse off with trade in this 
model while the risk aversion of consumers makes the reduction in risk they face 
a benefit from trade that must be weighed against the consumer loss associated 
with relocation of productive resources.  For some parameter values, Newbery and 
Stlglitz show that the opportunity to trade can lead to a Pareto inferior 
outcome.  We  explore a similar setup and show that, when the government has more 
flexibility than the production sector and finds policy commitments  infeasible. 
it will be unable to use trade policy to keep the economy from the Pareto 
inferior free trade equilibrium. 
Following Newbery and Stiglitz, we  consider two countries——home (no star) 
and foreign (star)——both of which use "capital'  to produce a risky good and a 
safe good.  Each country has  n  identical producers, each owning one unit of 
capital, and  m  identical consumers, each with a constant amount of income  I, 
which can be  thought of  as their endowment of a third (numeraire) good.  The 
Output of  the risky good is perfectly negatively correlated across countries: —  12  - 
that  is,  if output per unit of capital of the risky good is  2,  a random 
2  * 
variable with mean unity and variance  o ,  then  0 ÷  0  =  2.  The Output of the 
safe good per unit of  capital is normalized to unity. 
As in Newbery and Stiglitz, we consider only symmetric equilibria in which 
the domestic and foreign choices coincide.  We  will focus on the decisions of 
domestic producers and consumers.  Competitive risk averse producers choose a 
fraction  x  of  their capital to allocate to the risky project, the remainder 
(i—x)  going to produce the safe good.  Assuming that producers do not consume 
what they produce and that they maximize expected utility of  profits, the choice 
of  x  will be given by the solution to 
tU'(It)(pO—q)  0  (1) 
where  p (q)  is the price of the risky (safe) good,  II  xpe 
+  q(1—x)  are 
producer  profits,  and  EU(rl)  is the expected utility of  profits with 
U'  >  0  and  U" < 0.  Finally, as in Newbery and Stiglitz, the indirect utility 
function of the representative consumer is assumed to take the following form: 
—a  —b 1—p 
(Ip  q  for  p*1 
V(I,p,q) =  1  (2) 
log I — alog  p — blog  q  for pi 
where  p  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  This leads to 
aggregate  (domestic) demand functions for the risky  and safe  (Q5) 
commodities of  Q  and  Q  -  r  p  5  q 
The domestic government controls the volume of  international trade through 
the use of trade quota licenses, which  it issues (free of  charge) to foreign 
producers allowing them  to export to the home market, and to  domestic producers —  13  — 
allowing then, to export abroad.  To model this,  we define  I  as  the fraction of 
one country's excess of  risky commodity production over the other country's that 
can be  exported under the chosen quota levels.  Then the domestic government 
chooses  T,  which ranges from zero to one half, with  I - 0  corresponding to 
autarky and  I =  ccrresponding to free trade. 
For any choice of  x,  the volume of trade allowed under the quota System 
will directly affect the behavior of equilibrium goods prices, as  can be seen by 
equating commodity demand in the domestic market  to commodity Supply available 
there, or 
aml  *  brnI  nx0  + T.[nxq  —nx0, — (1—x)n  (3) 
* 
Rearranging  (3) and  using the relationship between  0  and  0  yields 
=  ay  fJ4)  xq2T(-0)I  q  1-x 
where  y - -.  At the same time, the choice of  I  will effect commodity 
prices  p  and  q  indirectly as well, through its effect on  the producer choice 
of  x  that solves (1).  Finally, to keep the problem simple,  we assume that all 
capital In the domestic production sector is owned by foreigners, so that the 
domestic government cares only about the welfare of  domestic consumers when 
choosing  T.  As we  will see,  this assumption turns the problem into one in which 
the government chooses trade policy in an attempt to address a domestic 
production distortion that arises under free trade. 
Consider now the domestic government's optimal choice of trade policy  T. 
If it were to choose a policy of  autarky  (1—0)  and producers believed this 
announcement, then all risk would be borne by  consumers, and the allocation of —  1k  — 
resources between the risky and safe commodity would be  determined by (1)  as 
x(T=O)  -cg .  But  for any choice of  trade policy  Tc[O,V2J,  the choice of 
x  that maximizes consumer utility, i.e.,  which solves  = 0,  is also 
sc  that only  expecting autarky would producers choose the allocation of resources 
that is best for  consumers.  As  T  is increased from  0  toward  ,  the  risk 
is shifted from consumers to producers, and producers find it optimal to reduce 
x  from  and move resources cut of the increasingly risky sector.  This 
resource allocation effect  is,  tc domestic consumers, a cost of freer trade which 
must be  weighed against the benefit that results as ccnsumers face less risk 
(price variability).  It is the effect of trade on  prcducers' choice of  x  that 
enables Newbery and Stiglitz to find parameter values under which free trade is 
Pareto infericr to sutarky.  More  generally, free trade  (T = ) will  not be 
cptimal as a result of this effect, and scme degree of  protection will be chosen 
as the cptimsl policy. 
Ccnsider, however, the choice of  T  made by  the dcmestic government when  it 
is unable tc influence producer decisions abcut  x  by preccmmiting to a 
particular trade policy  T,  and is forced intc a time ccnsistent equilibrium. 
The time consistent level cf trade will occur at a value of  T  fcr which the 
dcmestic gcvernment has no incentive to surprise producers with a different trade 
level.  But caring only about dcmestic ccnsumers, any announced level of 
protection  (T < 5)  will  leave the gcvernment with an inrentive tc surprise 
producers with free trade  (T = 3)  since, with  x  held fixed, the movement to 
free trade can only benefit domestic consumers by eliminating the risk they 
face.  Free trade Is the unique time consistent equilibrium. —  15  — 
As  such,  a  government  that  maintains  flexibility  of'  its trade policy 
relative to the decisions of  domestic producers Would in this case find  itself 
trapped in the time consistent free trade equilibrium.  Trade policy discretion 
will, in this case, lead the government to allow too much  trade and could, under 
the kinds of parameterizations described by Newbery and Stiglitz, result in trade 
freely occurring between countries even though all participants Would be better 
off in its absence. 
V.  Generalizations and Extensions 
The results of the previous sections were based on a one shot game. 
Moreover, the extensive form of  such a game assumed that trade policy was set In 
between production and consumption decisions. 
The normative results concerning the suboptimality of discretion and the 
ambiguity of  the rankings of alternative instruments  are robust to several 
extensions of the underlying framework, as long as  some economic decision is made 
before observing the trade policy action.  If  the game were repeated over time, 
however, the government might face reputational incentives.  As Is well known 
from the macroeconomics literature, such reputation mechanisms could reduce the 
severity of  the time inconsistency problem.  The plausibility of  reputational 
equilibria however is still an open issue (see,  for Instance, the survey by 
Rogoff  (1987)). 
The  positive results presented in the previous sections, on  the other hand, 
are more sensitive to the details of the timing assumptions.  In an explicitly 
dynamic model,  for  instance, the decisions concerning savings and the purchase of 
consumer durables would be based on  the expectations of future trade policy. —  16  — 
Hence,  the government would have the opportunity of  surprising consumers as well 
as producers.  Alternatively, the government might take its trade policy actions 
after some production decisions but before others, so that the opportunity to 
surprise would exist Only with respect to a subset of the production decisions. 
An  example  is the labor—leisure choioe mentioned in footnote 3.  In these oases, 
the nature of the incentive oompatability condition, and hence the positive 
properties of  the time—consistent equilibrium, would reflect the details of the 
timing assumptions.  As  a consequence, the clear and simple positive results in 
the general analysis of Section II could be  overturned.  Acknowledging these 
complications, however, does not diminish the relevance of  our positive results 
for the class of  problems that are broadly consistent with the simple timing 
assumptions maintained above.  Nor does it weaken our main point:  the second— 
best nature of trade policy intervention suggests that the issue of time 
consistency will be an important consideration in determining the extent as well 
as  the efficacy of  such policy intervention in most environments. 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
The general analysis and examples of the previous sections point cut that 
increasing the discretion and flexibility of  the government decision process may 
be counterproductive.  Many of  the same market imperfections that motivate trade 
policy intervention can also generate time inconsistencies in the implementation 
of  the optimal activist policies.  Whenever this happens, a government pursuing a 
discretionary trade policy finds itself  trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium. 
Thus, a commitment to a simple set of trading  rules may be superior to an 
activist but discretionary trade policy. —  17  — 
It is riot  surprising that these conclusions resemble those of the  debate on 
rules versus discretion in macroeconomic policy:  a careful analysis of the 
government incentives is bound to  find that the scope of economic policy (whether 
trade, monetary, or public finance policy) is limited by the government's ability 
to influence private sector expectations.  This Is why the government can benefit 
by being endowed with the possibility of entering into  binding commitments.  In 
the case of  trade policy, however, and in contrast to  other aspects of economic 
policy, institutions capable of enforcing these commitments nay be more readily 
available.  Existing international organizations, like the GATT,  were originally 
conceived to facilitate international cooperation among individual countries. 
The results of this paper suggest that these institutions can—-and presumably to 
some extent already do--perform an  equally crucial role in enforcing the 
cooperative outcome in a setting in which the strategic Interaction is between 
each government and the private sector at home or abroad. —  18  — 
Footnotes 
1-"  For  inatanoe, Dixit (1987)  oonoludes, "The ourrent median view of  the 
profession in this matter osn be  fsirly oharaoterized as (i)  a reoognition 
that the existenoe of  imperfeot oompetition does modify or overturn some 
oonventional beliefs about trade polioy, and (U) an awareness that the 
design of polioy to fit eaoh situation requires olose attention to its 
speoifio details.  This suggests that researoh should be direoted toward 
improving our understanding of  the realities of some industries that are 
likely oandidates for strategio trade polioies." 
It is well known that for a distorted small open eoonomy trade polioy is 
generally not the first best tool.  Unless a two—part tariff polioy oan be 
used, a tariff is also not first best for a large open eoonomy, sinoe it 
leaves some monopoly rents unexploited.  Henoe, in this oase too,  the 
government laoks a polioy instrument. 
1"  For  simplioity, we  abstraot from the labor/leisure ohoioe in what follows. 
The natural way to introduoe this deoislon would be to treat it as a 
oonsumption deoiaion, I.e., made after having observed the government 
polioy.  This would oomplioate the analysis by  providing the government with 
the opportunity to surprise only with respeot to a subset of produotion 
deoisions.  See Seotion V for a disousaion of  how this would effeot our 
results. 
1"  The  literature on trade polioy Intervention foousea on  the use of  tariffs to 
oorreot distortions that fall within the traded seotor, a foous that we 
adopt here as well.  Introduoing a nontraded seotor leaves the entire 
analysis qualitatively unaffeoted as long as the distortion remains within 
the traded goods seotor and that produotion deoisions in the nontraded —  19  — 
sector  are made prior to the government policy move.  On  the incorporation 
of nontraded goods into the traditional analysis of  tariffs, see Woodland 
(1 982) 
See, for  example, Bhagwati (1971). 
See, for  example, Bhsgwati (1971). 
While  (i),  (ii) and (iii)  consider the time consistency of  tariff 
intervention  in the presence cf distortions that keep the economy from the 
Pareto optimum, the use of tariffs to pursue so—called "non—economic" 
objectives with regard to consumption, production, or trade would run into 
exactly analagous problems. 
A more detailed analysis can be found in Stalger and Tabellini (1987). 
Eaton and Grossman (1985)  show that such a policy can be optimal ex-ante, in 
the sense that it can achieve some beneficial risk sharing between risk 
averse  individuals  when insurance markets are Incomplete.  See Dixit (1987), 
however, for a recent challenge to h1s  view.  An  alternative motivation for 
the use of tariffs as redistributive devices could come from a political 
economy perspective. —  20  — 
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